Abstract-The Apache™ Hadoop® framework provides parallel processing and distributed data storage capabilities that data analytics applications can utilize to process massive sets of raw data. These Big Data applications typically run as a set of MapReduce jobs to take advantage of Hadoop's ease of service deployment and large-scale parallelism. Yet, Hadoop has not been adapted for multilevel secure (MLS) environments where data of different security classifications co-exist.
INTRODUCTION
The US Department of Defense (DoD) and US Intelligence Community (IC) recognize they have a Big Data problem. High volumes of streaming data are ingested from the tactical edge, originating from a variety of sensors [1] . The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency anticipates collecting on the order of four petabytes, annually [2] . Mission analytics may further require archival data to compare with current intelligence data.
Agencies are embracing a data-centric model that empowers analysts to query data anywhere in the cloud, based on need-to-know. The IC envisions an agile, shared cloud architecture, following this paradigm [3] . The NSA reportedly operates three private clouds, already: a utility cloud, a storage cloud and a data cloud; the latter uses versions of Hadoop and MapReduce to manage intelligence analytics [4] . The Naval Tactical Cloud (NTC) employs distributed cloud-based data services to provide timely access to mission-relevant intelligence and operational data under advanced AntiAccess/Area Denial conditions. The NTC architecture leverages an open-source software stack featuring HDFS, Hadoop MapReduce, ZooKeeper and Accumulo [5] .
The ability of these products to appropriately handle data of multiple classifications is dubious. Researchers have already discovered commercial cloud products where information flows violating the isolation requirements for multi-tenancy both leaked cryptographic keys and exposed private data [6] [7] .
The prototype described here is part of our larger investigation into security issues for cloud computing with Big Data from sources of different sensitivities. We describe our initial experiments using a modified MapReduce platform to perform Big Data analytics across security domains in an MLS environment, leveraging a novel architecture supported by an underlying secure platform. This MLS-aware cross-domain Hadoop (CD-Hadoop) prototype is implemented using Security Enhanced Linux 1 (SELinux) [8] configured to enforce MLS policy following the Bell-LaPadula confidentiality policy model [9] . SELinux mediates access to information of different sensitivity levels based on hierarchical and non-hierarchical security labels of the subjects and objects; Hadoop itself is not involved in MLS policy enforcement. The problem of inadvertent contamination of low information by inept or malicious users is beyond the scope of this work.
The remaining sections describe Hadoop [10] , the concept of operations, the system architecture, and the implementation of a CD-Hadoop prototype. We conclude by discussing performance tests used to evaluate the overhead incurred while processing read-down operations.
II. BACKGROUND Apache
Hadoop is an open-source implementation that is based on the Google File System [11] and the MapReduce parallel computational model developed by Google [12] . The Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS) consists 2 of three components: the NameNode, Secondary NameNode and DataNode. Two components comprise the Hadoop MapReduce engine: the JobTracker and the TaskTracker. In a Hadoop cluster, there are one NameNode, one Secondary NameNode, one JobTracker, and multiple DataNodes and TaskTrackers.
To run a MapReduce job, the client first copies the job's input data, configuration file and Map and Reduce functions onto the Hadoop file system as HDFS files. Each file is divided into multiple HDFS blocks, stored on the DataNodes. The client then submits the job to the JobTracker, which creates a set of Map and Reduce tasks for the job. The JobTracker delegates these tasks to different TaskTrackers and monitors the progress of all jobs. Each TaskTracker executes the tasks assigned to it by the JobTracker and regularly informs the JobTracker about the status of all outstanding tasks and when it is ready to run a new task. Next, we describe the NameNode 1 In particular, Fedora 13 with Security Enhanced Linux enabled was used. 2 Description reflects Hadoop v0.20.2, used in our prototype. The views expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
and DataNode components in more detail, as our design significantly impacts those components.
A. NameNode
A NameNode is a daemon that manages the HDFS file system namespace and coordinates file access requests from clients. An HDFS file consists of blocks that are replicated and stored on different DataNodes. The block size and replication factor are configurable; defaults are 64MB and 1x, respectively. The NameNode decides where the blocks are to be replicated and informs the corresponding DataNode of its selection.
The primary HDFS namespace data structure (fsImage) contains the metadata associated with individual files, e.g., file properties and the locations where each block and its replicas are stored. The NameNode also uses a transaction log (edits) to keep track of changes to the HDFS metadata. Both data structures are stored as files in the NameNode's local file system. During start-up, the NameNode reads both files, creates a new fsImage file in volatile memory, applies the changes indicated by the edits log, clears edits, and persists both back to disk. During runtime, whenever the edits structure is updated, it is flushed to disk.
B. DataNode
A DataNode is a daemon that provides the block storage functionality for the cluster. The DataNode stores blocks as files in its local file system. After getting information about the blocks associated with a particular HDFS file from the NameNode, a client sends data requests to the DataNodes that are directly responsible for those particular blocks. The DataNode sends periodic messages to the NameNode, informing it of its status.
III. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
Hadoop enforces an application-level discretionary access control policy using permission bits similar to UNIX file access controls. Hadoop also maintains user sessions based on the user login IDs. However, with respect to mandatory access control, Hadoop lacks the ability for an authenticated user to negotiate a session at a specific sensitivity level, which would be used to determine the resources that user can access under MLS policy. In our CD-Hadoop prototype, the user session level is implicitly established by the sensitivity level of the network interface and TCP/IP port from which the request is received.
The Hadoop file system is structured as a hierarchical tree of directories and files, with an interface similar to the traditional UNIX file system. In a traditional Hadoop cluster, there is only one file system and its root is at "/". In our MLSenhanced cluster, there are multiple file systems, one per sensitivity level.
Each of these file systems is managed by an HDFS instance that runs at that level. The root directory of a file system at a particular level is expressed as /<level> (e.g., /unclass, /sec-level0). The <level> value is a user-defined string that is administratively associated with one SELinux sensitivity level. To be backward compatible with existing applications, the CD-Hadoop prototype treats the traditional root directory (/) as the file system root at the user's session level. For example, a client running at SECRET can access files stored under the SECRET root directory as either /secret/<filename> or, simply, as /<filename>.
A user can access HDFS file objects using tools provided with the Hadoop distribution (e.g., FS Shell) and with HDFSaware applications that use the HDFS API. A user can read and write file objects at their session level, but can only read file objects at lower levels, i.e., the user can read any objects whose level is dominated by their session level. Writes are only permissible at the user's current session level.
IV. SYSTEM OVERVIEW Software is considered MLS-aware if it executes without privileges in an MLS environment, and yet takes advantage of that environment to provide useful functionality [13] . For example, on a system enforcing a mandatory security policy as modeled by Bell and LaPadula, when an application executes at a particular sensitivity level, it can read from resources labeled at the same or lower levels but can only write to resources labeled at the same level or higher. If the application is modified to reflect the underlying mandatory policy-e.g., to return the level of the data or make decisions based on the level of the data-we say that the application is MLS-aware.
The Hadoop code base is large and very complex. Thus, it is prudent to minimize the code changes required to make Hadoop MLS-aware. The Hadoop MapReduce engine enables parallel data processing while HDFS provides distributed data storage. Although the MapReduce server processes keep their internal data structures on the local file system, the data used by the Map and Reduce application tasks are kept in the HDFS. Hence, this project focuses on making HDFS MLS-aware, a step towards a secure Hadoop platform suitable for use in MLS environments. In our proof-of-concept design, HDFS server processes running at their particular sensitivity levels are cognizant of the file system namespaces at lower security levels and can access those file objects as the system's security policy permits. To use this design with real data, each physical node in the Hadoop cluster must be hosted on a trusted platform that mediates the node's access to the local file system (where local files are labeled) according to an MLS policy.
Before discussing our implementation of the CD-Hadoop prototype, we describe the high-level functional requirements for the system and its information flow design. The CDHadoop system must satisfy the following requirements:
• Allow users to modify data only at their session level;
• Allow users to observe data at their session level and at lower sensitivity levels;
• Support a backward compatible HDFS API, to allow existing applications (which do not require read-down support) to run unmodified;
• Defer MLS policy enforcement to the underlying trusted computing base (TCB);
• Minimize the introduction of trusted processes, which would extend the TCB boundary. In particular, avoid a trusted proxy that can communicate server processes running at different le
• Minimize changes to the existing HDF is motivated by our desire to both mi simplify upgrading to new Hadoop rel Given these requirements, an information the CD-Hadoop system was developed (see F of the Hadoop server processes run at each se the same physical node. The underlying TCB servers) enforces domain separation, informat and mandatory access controls. Our SELinux uses sixteen sensitivity levels and up to 1,024 c Information flow between an application remote) and the Hadoop server processes is co MLS policy. Specifically, the applicat communicate with Hadoop processes running as the application's session level. When an ap at SECRET requires read-access to an UNCLASS, it must request the HDFS se SECRET to perform this operation on its beh HDFS server is not trusted with respect to MA perform its other security functions correctly read-down implementation are discussed in the V. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENT This section describes the design mechanisms of the prototype CD-Hadoop syste
A. Prototype Design
In a CD-Hadoop cluster, there is one phy node and multiple physical DataNode node NameNode instances run on the same phy node, whereas DataNode instances are di different physical nodes. A notional heter enhanced cluster, capable of handling data different levels, is illustrated in Fig. 2 In the example scenarios depict multi-block files with blocks stored and Z are single-block files stored Client-TS requests file W, a file at that level (NN-TS) directs it to re corresponding TS DataNode instanc contrast, when Client-TS requests lower level (S), it is instructed to DataNode instances (DN1-TS, D surrogate DataNodes for the blocks (on DN1-S, DN2-S). This is becau is higher than the levels of the bl enforcement does not allow write-d Upon receiving the requests, the (DN1-TS, DN2-TS) will perform re as dashed lines in Fig. 2 ) and retur Similarly, node DN3-S handles rea labeled at U. No other scenarios in and are straight-forward, e.g., Client ataNode instance running at d blocks. This is necessary ate directly with a primary s session level does not of the primary DataNode e number of primary and ning on a physical node is FS configuration files.
client requests a file, the the client to retrieve the Nodes responsible for those more complicated with the t. To handle a read-down ing at the client's sensitivity the requested file and the blocks from the NameNode d (lower) sensitivity level. s a DataNode instance to directed by the NameNode), e and read the file used to al file system. The level of l of the requested block.
d-down operations ted in Fig. 2 , X and W are on different nodes, while Y d on separate nodes. When its level, the NameNode at etrieve the blocks from the ces (DN1-TS, DN2-TS). In read access to file X at a contact the co-located TS DN2-TS), which are the s associated with the file X se the client's session level locks, and the MLS policy down or read-up operations. TS surrogate nodes for X ad-down operations (shown rn the results to Client-TS. ad-down requests for file Z n Fig. 2 involve read-downs t-S accesses file X.
B. Prototype Implementation
The read-down mechanisms introduced in the CD-Hadoop prototype mostly impact the NameNode and DataNode logic and not the JobTracker and TaskTracker logic, as those components only interact with the NameNode and DataNode as HDFS clients.
1) Changes to NameNode
In its original design, whenever a change is made to the file system (e.g., when a directory is created), the NameNode daemon updates the fsImage and blockMap data structures that it uses for file system management. The fsImage database keeps track of the current file hierarchy, while the blockMap database records the DataNode where each block is stored. Both databases are kept in the NameNode's private memory and are not visible to other NameNode instances.
Our design introduces two additional data structures, the Cache-fsImage and the Cache-blockMap, to allow a high sensitivity NameNode instance to look up file metadata and block storage information associated with a file at a lower level. Each NameNode instance manages its own CachefsImage and Cache-blockMap on the local RAM disk. For every write request, the NameNode instance servicing the request updates pertinent information in the fsImage and blockMap databases, and then copies the entire content of these databases to the Cache-fsImage and Cache-blockMap structures.
Other NameNode instances consult the Cache-fsImage and Cache-blockMap structures to handle read-down requests, if their sensitivity levels strictly dominate the sensitivity levels of these objects. These other NameNodes use the file metadata obtained from the Cache-fsImage to check for file permission and block allocation, and the blocks-to-DataNodes mapping information from the Cache-blockMap to inform the requesting client where blocks are located. The client contacts surrogate DataNodes to perform the actual read-down data transfer.
Concurrent access to the Cache-fsImage and CacheblockMap by different processes is synchronized using a lockfree multiple-reader, single-writer integrity mechanism-a high reader gets a valid view of data at a lower level without using locks. Our read-and-retry data consistency mechanism has been designed so that no new covert channels are introduced.
2) Changes to DataNode
Each block is stored as two files-a block file and a metadata file-on either the local file system or a remote file system, e.g., an NFS volume. In its original design, the DataNode daemon maintains a blocks-to-files map to keep track of the file used to store each block on the local file system. Created during initialization, the volumeMap is updated at run-time whenever a new block is allocated to the DataNode or an existing block becomes inaccessible, e.g., the block is deleted or the file storing the block is corrupted.
When a client asks to read an HDFS file at a lower level, the NameNode instance running at the client's session level directs the client to contact the file's surrogate DataNode, colocated with the primary DataNode actually handling the file's blocks. To return a requested block at a lower level, a surrogate DataNode instance must have access to the volumeMap maintained by the primary DataNode instance, to locate the (non-HDFS) files associated with the requested block. Since the volumeMap is kept in each DataNode's private memory, a Cache-volumeMap is used to capture the content of the volumeMap on the system's RAM disk, so that all surrogate DataNodes whose levels dominate that of the CachevolumeMap can read it while handling read-down requests.
The DataNode instances use the same read-and-retry synchronization mechanism utilized by the NameNode to access the shared Cache-volumeMap.
C. Implementation Discussion
Given our objectives to minimize changes to the Hadoop code base and avoid introducing trusted processes, a number of design choices were made for the prototype implementation.
1) Extended Block ID to Distinguish Levels
To ensure uniqueness, the NameNode daemon generates a 64-bit pseudo-random number (via the Java pseudo-random number generator) for the Block ID of each new block. In the CD-Hadoop prototype, the Block ID is extended to include the security label associated with the block, to partition the namespace across the Hadoop instances. The Extended Block ID includes a new 4-byte identifier (Level ID), describing the sensitivity level of each block. An alternative design is to introduce a new process to manage a pool of Block IDs for the entire cluster. In this alternative design, instead of generating the Block IDs, the NameNode would obtain them from the new process; however, adding a new process would complicate the overall design, and the additional inter-process communication may further decrease the performance of the NameNode.
With a Level ID in the block identifier, the DataNode can determine independently whether to use its own volumeMap or a Cache-volumeMap at some lower level to look for the file data. Without the Level ID, the DataNode must search, with a consequent performance impact, its volumeMap and the CachevolumeMaps at all lower levels until the required data is found.
2) Scalability across Sensitivity Levels
Regarding block storage, the original HDFS design scales linearly, as DataNodes work independently and the number of DataNodes in a cluster can grow over time. The management of the file namespace and block information, however, introduces a performance bottleneck, since there is only one NameNode in the cluster and the NameNode keeps the fsImage and blockMap databases entirely in memory. In addition, the NameNode is also highly susceptible to resource exhaustion.
The recently introduced HDFS Federation architecture [14] addresses NameNode scalability by keeping block information across multiple NameNodes. Although this approach partitions the Hadoop file system into multiple namespaces, the memory exhaustion problem still exists since the NameNode continues to keep the fsImage and blockMap databases in memory.
In the MLS-enhanced environment, the memory exhaustion problem on the NameNode is exacerbated since there are multiple instances of the NameNode server process on a physical node, requiring additional memory for the CachefsImage and Cache-blockMap structures. Using a separate physical node as a Cache Manager to maintain these databases may ameliorate this problem. With multiple single-level instances of the Cache Manager on the new node, one per sensitivity level, each Cache Manager instance would provide services that a NameNode instance at the same level could use to store and retrieve these databases.
Using the sensitivity level of the receiving NIC as the requestor's session level, the current prototype can only handle simple policies with a small number of sensitivity levels-a typical server platform can support up to 16 NICs. This limits the prototype's ability to scale up to a larger number of levels. A more flexible system design such as the Monterey Security Architecture (MYSEA) could be leveraged to overcome this limitation. MYSEA supports an MLS LAN interface on which users can negotiate sessions at different levels [15] [16] . Similar to MYSEA, using one MLS-NIC would allow the prototype to support more complex policies. 
3) Implementation Complexity
Source lines of code (SLOC) can be quickly calculated and thus is commonly used as an intuitive metric to estimate the complexity of software and development cost in terms of program size. The Count Lines of Code (CLOC) tool [17] was utilized to compare the SLOC of the original Hadoop HDFS code with the MLS-aware HDFS code (see Table 1 ).
CLOC can calculate differences in blank, comment, and source lines in a given file, directory, or archive. The SLOC values shown in Table 1 summarize the number of source lines that were added, removed, modified or unchanged. The delta value is the sum of the addition, removal, and modification of source lines. The percent change value reflects the overall increase in the SLOC between the original and MLS-aware Hadoop, demonstrating that the prototype appears to meet our requirement to minimize changes to the existing software (under the assumption that <10% overall change is acceptable).
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section describes the performance of our MLS-aware Hadoop prototype on a virtualized test environment.
A. Benchmark Configuration
The test cluster consists of eleven nodes distributed across two racks. Each node in the cluster is a virtual machine (VM) hosted on VMware ESXi 5.0.0. Rack-1 contains three server blades (each, a Dell PowerEdge R710 system, with 8 CPUs x 2.925 GHz with hyper-threading active, 48GB of memory and Gigabit Ethernet); Rack-2 contains a single server blade (a Dell PowerEdge R610 system, with 8 CPUS x 2.26 GHz with hyper-threading active, 24GB of memory and Gigabit Ethernet). The racks are connected with multi-port Gigabit Ethernet switches.
The Hadoop distribution includes a number of performance benchmarking tools that run as MapReduce jobs. The following tools were used to gauge the performance of the current prototype: (a) NNBench, a NameNode stress test; (b) TestDFSIO, an HDFS I/O performance test that reads and writes files in parallel; and (c) TeraSort, a combination of three test applications designed to sort large amounts of data. Mahout's Recommender example program [18] was used to measure performance, representing a real-world, popular MapReduce application.
Each test scenario was run on both the original Hadoop and the CD-Hadoop. The JobTracker's web interface was used to collect job statistics. The HDFS directory used by each test program was removed before starting each test case.
B. Benchmark Results
The NNBench program stresses the NameNode by creating zero-length files, thus forcing the NameNode to repeatedly update its databases. Under this test, the performance of our prototype degrades almost exponentially as the number of files increases. This performance behavior is caused by the overhead of caching the fsImage and blockMap every time a file is created/modified. Note that NNBench is designed to strain the NameNode with excessive file system operations with zero data, and is not representative of a normal load.
The TestDFSIO program is designed to measure the I/O performance of HDFS in a normal context. The test consists of writing and reading three datasets of different sizes: 1GB, 10GB and 20GB. The results indicate that for the 1GB and 10GB test cases, the prototype performance is marginally slower for both read and write tests. However for the 20GB test case, the writing overhead is much higher while the reading overhead is slightly lower (but still within the margin of error). These write operations take longer because there are more blocks associated with the 20GB file, so it takes more time to flush the entire blockMap to the RAM disk.
The TeraSort test suite was executed three times with different data sizes: 1GB, 10GB and 20GB. For each trial, its three test utilities are invoked in the same order: (TeraGen TeraSort TeraValidate). Without read-down operations, the TeraSort test results are roughly comparable to the performance of the original Hadoop. This indicates that the cost of accessing HDFS files has a minimal effect on the overall performance of a typical MapReduce job. However, the performance impact grows exponentially for read-down requests as the data size increases. The additional degradation was caused by the overhead of reading the cache databases, which the NameNode and DataNodes must do to handle a read-down request.
The Mahout Recommender test scenario used a 1MB dataset obtained from GroupLens Research [19] , which consisted of 1 million ratings of 4000 movies by 6000 users. This test consisted of running the Recommen times, in three different configurations: Hado without read-down, and CD-Hadoop with re the test programs discussed previously, whic MapReduce job, the Recommender test uses jobs. The averages of the five runs are present overhead of CD-Hadoop with no read-down, original Hadoop, is approximately 3.25%; the down overhead is about 0.08%, a total overhea The test data used contained one million e size was relatively small relative to typ applications (about 10MB). Tests with larg allow more meaningful reasoning about the p of the prototype with multi-job applications lik VII. RELATED WORK Roy et al. propose an approach that supp computations on sensitive data, while preservi the data providers [20] . Airavat runs on SE SELinux's default targeted policy-a relaxed policy that only constrains selected (targeted) modifies HDFS to enforce SELinux-like m control, expanding its reference monitor and T include complex application code. This is in c approach, which depends solely on SELinu enforcement to control information leaks resources.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The CD-Hadoop prototype demonstrates th practicality of using Hadoop in an MLS enviro instances of Hadoop servers can run at dif levels while their accesses to Hadoop resource by the underlying trusted OS. Our design do any trusted processes outside the pre-existing and only affects the HDFS servers. The curren is a first step toward a highly secure MapRedu can be used in high-risk MLS environme testing shows notable performance degrad pathological workload of the NameNode relatively modest performance overhead with access patterns. We believe a platform that can nder program five oop, CD-Hadoop ad-down. Unlike ch use only one ten MapReduce ted in Fig. 3 
